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Kathleen Hammond*  Searching for a Summary Judgment
 Equivalent in Quebec Procedural Law
The summary judgment is a procedural mechanism that is meant to improve the 
ef ciency of civil litigation by allowing a judgment to be delivered in a summary way, 
and without the need for a full trial. It is seen as an important tool for dealing with 
the growing problem of access to justice in Canada. Reform to Ontario’s summary 
judgment rules in 2010, and a liberal interpretation of the Ontario rules in the case 
of Hryniak v Mauldin, 2014, have led to a greater reliance by parties on summary 
judgment motions in Ontario. This trend is also apparent in other Canadian 
provinces, many of which have also liberalized their summary judgment rules in 
the past few decades. However, although a major reform of the Quebec Code of 
Civil Procedure took place and a new Code came into effect on 1 January 2016, 
the summary judgment was not introduced in the Quebec reform. In this paper, I 
explore whether there are other procedural tools in Quebec that approximate the 
summary judgment and argue that there are no functional equivalents. Quebec 
procedure, however, has its own tools to engage in the post-Hryniak cultural shift 
towards greater access to justice. These tools deal with access to justice uniquely 
and without some of the risks associated with summary judgment.
Le jugement sommaire est un mécanisme procédural qui vise à améliorer l’ef cacité 
des poursuites au civil en permettant au juge de rendre un jugement de façon 
sommaire, sans qu’il soit nécessaire de procéder à un procès au complet. Il est 
considéré comme un outil important pour faire face au problème croissant d’accès 
à la justice qui existe au Canada. La réforme des règles de l’Ontario en matière de 
jugement sommaire en 2010, et une interprétation libérale des règles de l’Ontario 
dans l’affaire Hryniak c. Mauldin, 2014, ont eu pour résultat une plus grande 
con ance des parties dans les requêtes de jugement sommaire en Ontario. Cette 
tendance se manifeste également dans d’autres provinces canadiennes, dont 
beaucoup ont également libéralisé leurs règles relatives au jugement sommaire 
au cours des dernières décennies. Cependant, bien qu’une réforme majeure 
du Code de procédure civile du Québec ait eu lieu et qu’un nouveau Code soit 
entré en vigueur le 1er janvier 2016, le jugement sommaire n’a pas été introduit 
dans la réforme québécoise. Dans cet article, j’examine s’il existe d’autres outils 
procéduraux au Québec qui se rapprochent du jugement sommaire et je soutiens 
qu’il n’y a pas d’équivalents fonctionnels. La procédure québécoise, cependant, 
dispose de ses propres outils pour s’engager dans le changement de culture qui 
a suivi l’arrêt Hryniak vers un meilleur accès à la justice. Ces outils visent l’accès 
à la justice de façon unique et sans certains des risques associés au jugement 
sommaire.
* Postdoctoral Fellow with the Research Group on Health and Law in the Faculty of Law at 
McGill University, and visiting scholar with the Petrie-Flom Center at Harvard University Law 
School. I would like to acknowledge the invaluable feedback received from Professor Rosalie Jukier 
on earlier drafts of this article. Thanks also goes to Timothy Lane and two anonymous peer reviewers 
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Introduction
Summary judgment is a procedural mechanism meant to improve the 
ef ciency of civil litigation. When a party brings a motion for summary 
judgment, the main inquiry is whether there is a dispute over a material 
fact that would require a full trial to be resolved. A court might  nd that it 
can deliver a judgment summarily on all, or part, of the claim.1 
1. Access to Justice: Interim Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in England 
and Wales (Great Britain: Lord Chancellor’s Department, 1995) (Lord Harry Woolf) ch 12 para 35. 
Lord Woolf explains the idea of a summary judgment as follows: 
[t]he procedure would be available from the beginning of the case: for example, a claimant 
could issue an application at the same time as he served his statement of case while a defendant 
could apply even before he had  led a defence in a suitable case. Although parties would be 
expected to make an appropriate application as early as they reasonably could, the procedure 
would be available throughout the proceedings, up to and including the trial. Whenever it had 
occasion to consider the case, the court would have to ask itself the question: “Can the case or 
part of it be disposed of without the full apparatus of trial?”
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Summary judgment is often seen as a tool for increasing access to 
justice, a major problem in Canada. Justice Karakatsanis in Hryniak 
v Mauldin goes as far as to say that “ensuring access to justice is the 
greatest challenge to the rule of law in Canada today. ”2 Improving access 
to justice was cited as the primary goal of recent civil procedure reform 
efforts in Ontario and Quebec.3 Reform to Ontario’s summary judgment 
rules in 2010, and a liberal interpretation of the Ontario rules in the case 
of Hryniak, has led to a greater reliance by parties on summary judgment 
motions in Ontario. This trend is also apparent in other Canadian provinces, 
many of which have liberalized their summary judgment rules in the past 
decades.4 Although a major reform of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure 
took place and a new Code came into effect on 1 January 2016, summary 
judgment was not introduced in the Quebec reform. 
No summary judgment procedure exists in the Code, unlike the 
approach in other provinces. However, in Hryniak, Justice Karakatsanis 
points out two articles of the Quebec Code that have been likened to 
summary judgment.5 In this paper, I explore whether there are other 
procedural tools in Quebec that approximate summary judgment. I argue 
that there are no functional equivalents, but Quebec procedure has its own 
tools that support the post-Hryniak cultural shift towards greater access to 
justice. These tools deal with access to justice uniquely and without some 
of the risks associated with summary judgment. In order to make this 
argument, I rely on a transsystemic approach to examine the effectiveness 
of the Ontario summary judgment Rule 20, in comparison to Quebec’s 
2. Hryniak v Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7 [Hryniak]. Justice Karakatsanis is of course referring to the fact 
that law is in itself found in court decisions and cases so in order to have rule of law, people have to 
be able to bring their cases to court. This is explained by JA Jolowicz, “On the Nature and Purpose of 
Civil Procedural Law” in On Civil Procedure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 62. 
3. See for instance the explanatory notes of the new Code of Civil Procedure: Explanatory Notes 
and Preliminary Provision, Bill 28 (2014, c. 1): An Act to establish the new Code of Civil Procedure. 
See also the letter of transmittal sent by the Honourable Coulter A. Osborne, who was tasked 
with making recommendations to improve the Ontario civil justice system in 2006. Osborne cites 
improving access to justice as his main goal for civil reform. See: The Honourable Coulter A Osborne, 
Civil Justice Reform Project—Letter of Transmittal (2007).
4. Alberta made recent reforms to its summary judgment rule, Alberta Rules of Court, Alta 
Reg 124/2010 r 7.3(1). See Alberta Rules of Court Project, Final Report No 95 (Alberta: Alberta 
Law Reform Institute, 2008) for an overview of the changes. In British Columbia a summary trial 
(originally r 18A, now r 9-7) was introduced in 1983 because of concerns that motions for summary 
judgment were too easily defeated and so were ineffective. See British Columbia Supreme Court 
Civil Rules, BC Reg 168/2009 r 9-7. For an overview of the development see CFCJ-FCJC, “BC 
Summary Trial (Rule 18A),” online: Inventory of Reforms <http://cfcj-fcjc.org/inventory-of-reforms/
bc-summary-trial-rule-18a/> [https://perma.cc/D984-AGT6].
5. Hryniak, supra note 2 at para 20. These are articles 54.1 et seq. and 165(4) of the Quebec Code 
of Civil Procedure then in force. 
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procedural tools.6 My focus on Ontario as a comparator province is due 
to the fact that the recent and major Supreme Court of Canada summary 
judgment decision of Hryniak examines the Ontario rules of procedure. 
I begin by explaining the transsystemic approach and the concept of 
mixity, which are inherent in civil justice systems in Canada, particularly 
in Quebec, because of Canada’s multiple legal traditions. In order to 
contextualize this discussion, I review the history of summary judgment, 
civil justice reform in Canada in the past decade and a half, and how this 
reform compares between Ontario and Quebec. I then assess whether there 
are procedural tools in Quebec that approximate summary judgment. I 
look at Quebec tools that have been suggested to be functional equivalents 
to Ontario’s summary judgment. Concluding that those tools are not 
functional equivalents, I assess the bene ts of Quebec’s unique tools, when 
used to address access to justice, in comparison to summary judgment. 
The goal of this paper is to add to the discussion on civil procedure in 
Canada which, as W.A. Bogart points out, is sorrowfully overlooked .7 
I. Mixity and a transsystemic approach 
Quebec has what has been called a mixed legal system. The concept 
of “mixity” refers to legal systems that have some degree of hybridity, 
meaning that there is a “mix of laws and judicial attributes that derive from 
multiple tradition-based sources. ”8 While these sources are usually from 
the common law and civil law traditions,9 they come from Indigenous 
and religious sources as well .10 Professor Rosalie Jukier observes that 
Quebec is a mixed legal system in “its substantive law, its procedural 
rules, and its institutions of justice.”11 For instance, even though private 
law in the province of Quebec is dealt with in accordance with the civilian 
legal tradition, procedural law and its judicial system have been greatly 
in uenced by the common law tradition. 
Transysstemic thinking is a fresh approach to comparative analysis 
that involves an integrated examination of different legal traditions and 
6. Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194, R 20 [Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure]. 
7. WA Bogart, “Summary Judgment: A Comparative and Critical Analysis” (1981) 19 Osgoode 
Hall L J 552 at 553.
8. Rosalie Jukier, “The Untapped Potential of Transsystemic Thinking” in Yaëll Emerich & Marie-
Andrée Plante, eds, Repenser Les Paradigmes: Approches Transsystémiques Du Droit (Cowansville: 
Yvon Blais, 2018) [Jukier, “Untapped Potential”].
9. William Tetley, “Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil Law (Codi ed and Uncodi ed)” 
(2000) 60:3 Louisiana Law Review 667 at 679.
10. Rosalie Jukier, “Quebec Procedural Law as a Microcosm of Mixity: Implications for Legal 
Pedagogy, Judicial Decision-Making, and Law Reform Symposium” (2016) 62 Loy L Rev 691 at 692 
[Jukier, “Microcosm of Mixity”].
11. Ibid at 694.
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systems.12 The approach is directed towards examining novel ways to 
deal with legal problems across jurisdictions and to encourage “cross-
fertilization” of these ideas.13 
The mixity of Quebec is particularly important in thinking about the 
role that the legal traditions underlying Quebec civil procedure might have 
played in the Quebec government’s decision not to introduce summary 
judgment in its procedural reform. A transysstemic analysis of Quebec 
and Ontario allows for an in-depth analysis of these two jurisdictions’ 
approaches to dealing with access to justice, with a view to learning from 
what is and is not working, in order to continue to improve access to 
justice. 
II. History of the summary judgment and the summary procedure
Summary judgment  nds its origins in Roman Law and customs dating 
back to the medieval period.14 This history has been summarized by 
scholars John Bauman, Edson R Sunderland, and Edward Greenbaume 
and LI Reade, among others .15 In 1855, England introduced a summary 
judgment provision through the Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange 
Act 1855, also known as the Keating’s Act.16 This Act came about as a 
response to economic and social pressure from business merchants and is 
thought to be the basis for the modern summary judgment.17 The summary 
judgment provision in the Act only applied to actions on bills of exchange 
and promissory notes .18 It was meant to provide an economical and 
expeditious procedure to obtain judgments against debtors who tried to 
use false defences to delay paying back their debts.19
The Judicature Act 187320 and 1875,21 and later the Rules of the 
Supreme Court 1883, further extended the summary judgment procedure 
to cover cases where the plaintiff tried to recover a debt or liquidated 
12. Shauna Van Praagh, “Palsgraf as ‘Transsystemic’ Tort Law” (2012) 6:2 Journal of Comparative 
Law 243.
13. Jukier, supra note 8.
14. Bogart, supra note 7 at 554.
15. John A Bauman, “The Evolution of the Summary Judgment Procedure: An Essay Commemorating 
the Centennial Anniversary of Keating” 31:3 Indian Law Journal 329; Edson R Sunderland, “The 
English Struggle for Procedural Reform” (1925) 5 Or L Rev 267; Edward S Greenbaum & LI Reade, 
The King’s Bench Masters and English Interlocutory Practice (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1932).
16. Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act, 1855, 18 & 19 VICT, c 67 (1855). For a detailed 
overview of how the Keating Act developed see: Bauman, supra note 15 at 334-339.
17. Bauman, supra note 15; Sunderland, supra note 15; Bogart, supra note 7.
18. Charles Clark & Charles U Samenow, “The Summary Judgment” (1929) 38 Yale LJ 423 at 424.
19. See the preamble of the Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act 1855 quoted in Clark & 
Samenow, ibid at 424. 
20. 36 & 37 Vict, c 66, Rule 7 of the Schedule.
21. 38 & 39 Vict, c 77, Order III, r.6, and Order XIV. 
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demand in money, as long as it fell within one of six categories.22 W.A. 
Bogart explains the procedure as one in which the plaintiff had to issue a 
specially endorsed writ (with a claim within one of a list of categories). 
The defendant had to appear to the writ.23 After the defendant appeared, 
the plaintiff could apply to the judge, on af davit, for a  nal judgment. The 
court would come to a judgment unless the defendant could show the court 
that they had a good defence.24 In 1937, drastic changes were made to the 
procedure, and it was also made applicable in the Queen’s Bench Division 
in all actions except a few that were speci cally enumerated.25 
England’s model of summary judgment was very in uential in the 
Canadian context, and a similar summary judgment procedure to what 
existed in England was adopted in a number of Canadian provinces, 
including Ontario, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, British Columbia, 
Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Alberta.26 Although beyond the scope of this 
paper, modern summary judgment rules in Canada also draw heavily from 
the United States. For example, Ontario’s summary judgment Rule 20, of 
the Rules of Civil Procedure, as it was in 1984, was modeled after Rule 
56 of the American Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which had been 
adopted by the US Federal Courts in 1938.27  
Quebec, on the other hand, did not have a summary judgment. It did 
have a summary procedure, but this was unlike the English summary 
judgment.28 Quebec’s summary procedure seems to have been based on 
the French civil summary procedure. In France, a summary procedure 
was  rst introduced in the 1200s, in the “Établissements de St. Louis.” 
22. Bogart, supra note 7 at 554; Clark & Samenow, supra note 18 at 424.
23. Bogart, supra note 7 at 554.
24. Ibid. 
25. Ibid at 556.
26. Bogart, supra note 7 at 556 footnote 19, observes that Ontario procedure seems to have been 
initiated in 1881. In 1927, following a number of revisions, Ontario Rule 33 resembled the procedure 
under the original English summary judgment rule that was borne out of the Keating’s Act and extended 
by the Judicature Act 1873 and Rules of the Supreme Court 1883. For information on the dates that 
the other provinces seem to have adopted summary judgment procedure, see: Clark & Samenow, 
supra note 18 at 439, footnotes 119-124. Evidence of summary judgment in the provinces can be 
found in New Brunswick as early as in 1912, in Nova Scotia in 1920, in British Columbia in 1912, 
in Saskatchewan as early as 1915, in Manitoba as early as 1891, in Alberta in 1914. For a discussion 
of the history of summary judgment in Alberta, see also Alberta Law Reform Institute. Alberta Rules 
of Court Project—Summary Disposition of Actions, Consultation Memorandum 12.12 (Edmonton, 
Alberta, 2004) at 25.
27. Rule 20 was the successor of Ontario’s Rule 33. Kenneth J Kelertas, “The Evolution of Summary 
Judgment in Ontario” (1998) 21:3 Advoc Q 265 at 290. See also Kelertas at 322 for a reproduction of 
the version of Rule 20 referred to, as well as for a reproduction of the American Rule 56. For a detailed 
overview of the development of summary judgment in the American states, see Clark & Samenow, 
supra note 18 at 440-471.
28. Clark & Samenow, supra note 18 at 439-440. 
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It originated in the principle that minor causes of “tri ing importance” 
should be decided through a brief form of procedure .29 The Prévot 
would try to hear the plaintiff and defendant on the same day they were 
summoned.30 If the defendant did not confess liability, then the defendant 
was allowed to produce witnesses. The Prévot examined these witnesses 
in secret and published their testimony. If the plaintiff objected to these 
witnesses, he was given only one day to produce his own witnesses and 
prove his objections. The whole process took only a few days and there 
was no appeal from the Prévot’s judgment. Summary procedure in France 
evolved and changed from the 1500s on, however, it consistently kept a 
few characterizing features: it was used for situations where only a small 
pecuniary value was involved, the process was compact, and the matter 
was resolved in just a few days.31 
Quebec’s summary procedure was set out in the Code of Civil 
Procedure 1922 .32 Like the French summary procedure, it allowed for 
a judgment to be given more quickly in an enumerated list of matters 
(16 matters in total).33 Among these enumerated matters were: “actions 
arising from the relation of lessor and lessee,”34 “actions founded on bills 
of exchange, promissory notes, cheques, or orders for payment,”35 and 
“actions by traders for the value of goods or articles sold, work done, 
materials furnished, or moneys disbursed.”36 This summary procedure 
included short deadlines for matters such as how quickly a plaintiff served 
the summons after  ling the application,37 the time they had to alert the 
29. Arthur Engelmann, A History of Continental Civil Procedure (Boston: Little Brown and 
Company, 1927) at 692. At Book IV Part II, Chapter II page 706 Engelmann writes: “There can be 
little doubt that the summary procedure originated in the canonical principle requiring that minor 
causes be instituted and decided “sine  gura et strepitu judicii.” Engelmann cites Beaumanoir. “It is 
not good,” Beaumanoir says, “nor according to God, that there be long pleas and great costs in little 
causes.”
30. The Prévot was a person in government. In the context of civil justice, this person oversaw the 
court. 
31. For an account of the summary procedure’s history in France see Engelmann, supra note 29. In 
particular, see Book IV, Part II, Chapter II at 706 for the 1300s to 1500s, Book IV, Part II, Chapter 
III at 745 for the 1500s to the Revolution, and Book IV, Part II, Chapter IV at 768 for the Revolution 
onwards.
32. Francis Joseph KC Curran, The Code of Civil Procedure of the Province of Quebec and Rules of 
Practice of the Superior Court, Circuit Court, and Court of King’s Bench (Montreal: Wilson & La eur, 
1922).
33. Ibid at art 1150. 
34. Ibid at art 1150(1). 
35. Ibid at art 1150(2).
36. Ibid at art 1150(3).
37. Per ibid at art 1153 they had one intermediate day when the place of service was within a distance 
of 15 miles. 
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opposite party of motions for preliminary exceptions,38 and how quickly 
defences had to be  led.39 The case could be inscribed for proof and hearing 
quickly after the defence had been  led.40 Only three days notice had to be 
given to the opposite party for the day  xed for proof and hearing.41 
France and Quebec’s summary procedures were different altogether 
from the United Kingdom’s summary judgment. What de ned the United 
Kingdom’s summary judgment was that the court made its judgment 
based on less, and largely written, evidence (like af davits). In France 
and Quebec’s summary procedures, parties still gave oral evidence and 
questioned witnesses. What made these summary procedures “summary,” 
as opposed to regular procedures, was that deadlines were shorter, and 
judges seemed to have a larger management role in proceedings. 
III. Civil justice reform
1. The Lord Woolf Report
Summary judgment, and its possible role in improving access to justice, 
has received renewed interest in Canada in the past decade and a half. This 
interest was sparked by a series of reports on the crisis in access to justice 
and proposals for major civil justice reform that were published in various 
jurisdictions around the world. The  rst of these reports was the Lord 
Woolf Report in the United Kingdom, which was extremely in uential in 
Canada. 
In 1994, Lord Woolf was appointed by the Lord Chancellor to review 
the rules of civil procedure in the United Kingdom. He produced an 
interim, and then a  nal report on access to justice in the United Kingdom.42
This 370-page report explored, in particular, what Lord Woolf saw as 
three critical issues affecting access to justice.43 First, it takes too long to 
bring a case to its conclusion. The second is the high cost of litigation, 
which often exceeds the value of the claim.44 Finally, Lord Woolf was 
concerned with the overly complex nature of the judicial process which is 
incomprehensible to many litigants. 
38. Per ibid at art 1154, this was usually two days.  
39. Per ibid at 1155, this was usually two days within the return of the action. 
40. Ibid at 1157 and 158.
41. Ibid at 1159.
42. Woolf, supra note 1, online: <https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20060213223540/
http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/ nal/contents.htm> [https://perma.cc/HAW6-PTZK].
43. Ibid at Section I Overview.
44. For an in-depth examination of the cost issues in the United Kingdom system and assessment 
of Lord Woolf’s proposal for dealing with this issue see: AAS Zuckerman, “Lord Woolf’s Access to 
Justice: Plus ça Change...” (1996) 59:6 The Mod L Rev 773 at 774.
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The Report provides a detailed set of recommendations for dealing 
with these issues. Accompanying the Report was a draft of general rules 
that would form the core of a new simpler procedural code. Among these 
recommendations was that the court should more frequently use its power 
of summary judgment. Lord Woolf recommended a new single procedure 
for summary judgment that, for simplicity sake, would merge several 
existing procedures into one. Under this new procedure, a plaintiff could 
apply for, and receive, summary judgment or summary determination on 
a point of law.45 The test for summary judgment centered on whether the 
court considered that a party had no realistic prospect of succeeding at trial 
on the whole case, or on a particular issue. A party that resisted the order 
would have to show not just that they had an arguable case, but that they 
had a real prospect of winning. This test was encapsulated in rule 24.2 of 
the United Kingdom’s Civil Procedure Rules.46 
2. Ontario: Report of the Honourable Coulter A Osborne 
Judicial reform was also occurring in Canada in the mid 1990s. At this 
time, the Canadian Bar Association (CBA) and a number of provincial 
task forces released recommendations on how to modernize Canada’s 
civil justice system. In Ontario, the Ontario Civil Justice Review focused 
on strategies to increase access to justice in the Ontario justice system.47
However, problems around access to justice, in particular cost and delay, 
persisted, and in the early 2000s, another wave of investigation began 
in order to improve civil justice in the provinces. As part of this wave 
of investigation, in 2006, the Attorney General of Ontario tasked the 
Honourable Coulter A. Osborne with assessing the Ontario civil justice 
system and identifying areas in need of reform. Justice Osborne consulted 
with the general public, bar associations, members of the judiciary, key 
litigant organizations, law  rms, of cials at the Ministry of Ontario and 
other users of the civil justice system.48 His Report and recommendations 
ultimately took into account the following three issues: access, 
proportionality, and culture of litigation. The Report was published in 2007 
45. Woolf, supra note 1, chapter 12 at paras 31-36.
46. United Kingdom Civil Procedural Rules 1998/3132.
47. The CBA and Ontario Civil Justice Review recommendations sparked changes in Ontario that 
included the introduction of simpli ed procedures, case management, mandatory mediation, and an 
increase in the monetary jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court. See Supplemental and Final Report 
of the Civil Justice Review (Toronto: Ontario Civil Justice Review, 1996); Report of the Task Force on 
Systems of Civil Justice (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association National Task force on Systems of Civil 
Justice, 1996). 
48. Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, “Civil Justice Reform Project,” (29 October 2015), 
online: Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General <https://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/
about/pubs/cjrp/030_introduction.php> [https://perma.cc/F3TQ-65C6].
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and the Ontario Attorney General’s Civil Rules Committee took a number 
of steps to improve the civil justice system that began to take effect in 
January 2010.49 These reforms included changes to Small Claims court,50
simpli ed procedure,51 discovery,52 expert evidence,53 case management,54
mandatory mediation,55 pre-trial conferences,56 and deadlines for serving 
and  ling motions.57 A general principle of proportionality was added to 
the civil court rules. Changes were also made to summary judgments. 
Prior to 2010, the former Ontario summary judgment rule had involved 
determining whether the claim or defence raised a “genuine issue for 
trial. ”58 This was in line with provinces like Manitoba and Prince Edward 
Island that also had a “genuine issue” test.59 The motion was decided 
on the basis of af davits of witnesses and the transcripts of their cross-
examinations, as well as transcripts of examinations for discovery. If the 
“genuine issue” was only a question of law, then the court could decide it. 
If a trial was needed, the court could order a trial, but in order to expedite 
the process, they could set out any material facts that were not in dispute, 
de ne what remaining issues needed to be tried, and order that the trial be 
heard in an accelerated way.60 
During Justice Osborne’s consultations on the Ontario civil justice 
system, a number of concerns about the existing summary judgment rule 
49. For Osborne’s  nal report, see The Honourable Coulter A Osborne, Civil Justice Reform Project: 
Summary of Findings & Recommendations (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario, 
2007), online: <https://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/cjrp/> [https://perma.
cc/US3M-4QLH] [Osborne, “Civil Justice Reform”].
50. The monetary limit was increased from $10,000 to $25,000. See “Reforming Civil Justice for 
Ontarians,” online: news.ontario.ca <https://news.ontario.ca/mag/en/2008/12/reforming-civil-justice-
for-ontarians.html> [https://perma.cc/H55E-7V3E].
51. Ibid. The monetary limit was raised and parties can now  nd out more about the opposing case 
before trial.
52. Ibid. For instance, parties have to agree on a discovery plan.
53. Ibid. Expert witnesses have to certify, in writing, their duty to the court to be fair. 
54. Ibid. Case management was no longer automatic. 
55. Ibid. Parties were given more time for mandatory mediation.
56. Ibid. Pre-trial conferences were made mandatory.
57. Ibid. These were shortened. 
58. For an overview of the development of the summary judgment rules in Ontario see: Hryniak, 
supra note 2 at paras 37-41; Janet Walker, “Summary Judgment Has its Day in Court” (2012) 37:2 
Queen’s Law Journal 695 at 696-701; T Walsh & L Posloski, “Establishing a Workable Test for 
Summary Judgment: Are We There Yet?” in TL Archibald & RS Echlin, eds, Annual Review of Civil 
Litigation (Carswell Thomson Reuters, 2013) at 422. Past rules included: Ontario, Rules of Court, 
Rules 14 and 15; Ontario, Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 33; The Supreme Court of Ontario 
Rules of Practice, Rule 33. Bogart, supra note 7 at 557 provides a critical evaluation of the former 
Rule 33.
59. See Manitoba, Court of Queen’s Bench Rules, Man Reg 553/88 r 20.03(1)-(4); Prince Edward 
Island Rules of Civil Procedure R 20. 
60. Walker, supra note 58.
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were raised .61 First, there were concerns that the “no genuine issue for 
trial” test was too hard to make out or was being interpreted by judges 
too narrowly. This meant that it was too dif cult to succeed on a summary 
judgment claim .62 Second, there was a concern that the summary judgment 
was all-or-nothing, meaning that either a summary motion was granted, or 
the parties were on their way to a full trial. It was suggested that the power 
of a judge on a motion for summary judgment needed to be expanded so 
that they could quickly resolve straightforward disputed facts—similar to 
a mini-trial. Third, there was concern over the presumptive cost sanctions 
for an unsuccessful summary judgment motion. If a summary judgment 
motion was unsuccessful, the moving party had to pay substantial 
indemnity costs unless they could convince the court that, even though 
their motion had not been successful, it had still been reasonable. Justice 
Osborne’s consultations revealed that the presumption that substantial 
indemnity costs would be imposed deterred people from bringing a 
summary judgment motion because it created too big a  nancial risk.63 
Finally, there was debate about whether a new summary trial 
mechanism, such as BC’s Rule 18A, should be introduced .64 The BC rule 
allows the court to grant judgment in cases where there is an issue on the 
merits, except if the court is unable “to  nd the facts necessary to decide 
the issues of fact or law”65 or “the court is of the opinion that it would be 
unjust to decide the issues on the application.”66 The court can use af davit 
and other documentary evidence, such as evidence taken on examination 
for discovery, and written statements of an expert’s opinion. The court can 
even order cross-examination on af davit evidence. The court can also 
make a variety of orders to expedite the trial. The summary trial option has 
been highly lauded in BC as having changed the practice of civil litigation 
in the province for good.67
After the release of the Osborne Report, the Ontario Attorney General’s 
Civil Rules Committee changed the language of the summary judgment 
rule from asking whether a case presented “a genuine issue for trial” to 
61. Osborne, “Civil Justice Reform,” supra note 49.
62. In Canada (Attorney General) v Lameman, [2008] 1 SCR 372 [Lameman] for example, even 
though the Supreme Court of Canada  nds that there is “no genuine issue for trial,” the Court 
nonetheless makes it clear that the bar is high to dismiss on summary judgment.
63. Osborne, “Civil Justice Reform,” supra note 49.
64. BC Supreme Court Rules, BC Reg 221/90, R 18A. The summary trial is now rule 9-7 in the 
Supreme Court Civil Rules, BC Reg 168/2009.
65. BC Reg 221/90, supra note 64 at R 18A(11).
66. Ibid.
67. Streamlining the Ontario Civil Justice System: A Policy Forum (Toronto, Ontario: Advocates’ 
Society, 2006) quoting Madam Justice Koenigsberg at 6.
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“a genuine issue requiring trial.”68 Judges were also given enhanced fact-
 nding powers.69 Judges can now weigh evidence, evaluate the credibility 
of a deponent, and draw a reasonable inference from the evidence.70 A 
mini-trial power allows the judge to order the hearing of oral evidence on 
a motion for summary judgment where, in the interests of justice, a brief 
trial is required to dispose of the summary judgment motion.71 However, 
this is different from the mini-trial recommended by the Osborne Report 
because,  rst, only judges (and not masters) can order this oral evidence. 
Second, the Report had recommended a “mini-trial” as an alternative to 
dismissing the motion. The idea was that witnesses would be called to 
testify, if needed for the interests of justice, in order for the court to decide 
the matter by way of a summary judgment motion. It should be noted, 
however, that the hearing of oral evidence is just to decide whether there is 
a genuine issue requiring trial (i.e. to dispose of a summary motion). Thus, 
as Janet Walker points out, summary judgment has essentially remained a 
“paper hearing.”72
The revised rule on “where trial is necessary” also gives the court 
greater powers.73 It permits these cases to enter a form of case management. 
Additionally, the presumption that the moving party would have to pay 
substantial indemnity costs if they were unsuccessful in obtaining summary 
judgment was eliminated. The wording of the rule was changed to make 
it clear that a court “may  x” substantial indemnity costs when any party 
has acted unreasonably in making or responding to a summary judgment 
or has acted in bad faith.74 
The Committee did not adopt the recommendation that a rule for 
summary trial, like in BC, be introduced, but in many ways the fact- nding 
powers that allow judges to weigh evidence and hear oral evidence come 
close to a summary trial. 
The initial interpretations of the 2010 amendments were unclear. The 
Ontario Court of Appeal in Combined Air Mechanical Services, 2011, 
argued that the amended Rule 20 added a third category of cases that are 
appropriate for summary judgment—cases where the motion judge is 
satis ed that a full trial is not necessary to serve the “interests of justice. ”75
This interpretation was still relatively conservative and did not seem to 
68. Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 6 at R 20.04(2)(a).
69. Ibid, R 20.04(2.1) and (2.2).
70. Ibid, R 20.04(2.1).
71. Ibid, R 20.04(2.2).
72. Walker, supra note 58 at 713.
73. Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 6 at R 20.05(1).
74. Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 6 at R 20.06(a) and (b).
75. Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc v Flesch, 2011 ONCA 764 [Combined Air].
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widen the possibility of more cases being decided by summary judgment.76
Three years later in Hryniak, however, the Supreme Court of Canada, in 
a unanimous decision written by Justice Karakatsanis, called for a shift 
in the legal culture and a much broader interpretation of the summary 
judgment amendments.77 Karakatsanis writes that a culture shift is 
required. Judges need to manage the legal process in line with the principle 
of proportionality.78 The decision suggests that it was incorrect to assume 
that the only thing a summary judgment does is dismiss an unmeritorious 
case. Instead, judges should see this as “a signi cant alternative model of 
adjudication.”79 The decision opened the doors for a much wider use of the 
summary judgment.80 Justice Karakatsanis wrote that the changes to rule 
20 following the Osborne Report demonstrate that a trial is not the default 
procedure, hence why the rule now asks whether there is “a genuine issue 
requiring trial.”81 Judges also received new fact- nding powers that they 
should exercise unless it is in the interest of justice to exercise these only 
at trial.82 
Hryniak created a roadmap of steps for judges to take in summary 
judgment motions.83 The court must  rst decide whether there is enough 
evidence to adjudicate the dispute fairly and justly and in a timely, 
affordable and proportionate way. Second, the court determines if it 
can decide the case in this manner by exercising its discretion to weigh 
evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses and draw reasonable 
inferences from the evidence available rather than evidence that would be 
produced at trial. Third, the court can consider ordering the presentation of 
limited oral evidence. Fourth, the court can decide to dismiss the summary 
judgment motion but craft a trial process while remaining seized of the 
matter, and  fth, in exceptional cases, a judge can dismiss the case without 
remaining seized.84 
Summary judgment was described by the Osborne Report as a tool 
to increase proportionality, reduce delays and costs, bring about a  nal 
early disposition, allow for greater access for unrepresented litigants, and 
76. Walker, supra note 58.
77. Hryniak, supra note 2 at para 32.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid at para 45.
80. Barbara Billingsley, “Hryniak v. Mauldin Comes to Alberta: Summary Judgment, Culture Shift, 
and the Future of Civil Trials” (2017) 55:1 Alta L Rev 1.
81. Hryniak, supra note 2, at para 43 [emphasis added]. 
82. Ibid at para 45. 
83. Ibid at paras 66-78. See application of these steps in ThyssenKrupp Elevator (Canada) Limited 
v Amos, 2014 ONSC 3910.
84. Hryniak, supra note 2 at paras 66-78. 
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provide  exibility.85 Many of these goals, such as proportionality, were 
cited by Justice Karakatsanis in Hryniak, as justi cations for widening 
the availability of summary judgment. One year after its release, Hryniak 
had been cited in 460 Canadian cases, 299 in Ontario alone .86 Of the 299 
Ontario cases, 217 involved summary judgment motions and full or partial 
summary judgment was granted 74.2% of the time.87 That represents a ten 
per cent increase in success rates from 2009–2012. Even though this may 
seem small, this is a notable change given that the 2010 changes, prior 
to the Hyrniak decision, did not lead to a noticeable increase in success 
rates.88 A study by Brooke MacKenzie evaluated whether the changes to 
the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure are actually achieving their desired 
effects. MacKenzie empirically analyzed all reported summary judgment 
decisions (2960 decisions) in Ontario between 2004 and 2015 and asked 
whether ef ciency and affordability were improved.89 She found that 
the number of summary judgment motions decided in Ontario in 2015 
represented a seventy per cent increase over the number decided in 
2009.90 She argues that the changes to Ontario’s summary judgment rules 
are achieving their desired effect and that the cultural shift called for in 
Hryniak is underway.91 
In determining whether there is no genuine issue requiring trial, 
judges are weighing evidence, evaluating the credibility of a deponent, 
and drawing inferences. Sometimes judges are dismissing issues, or 
judges are setting out the  ndings that they are able to make based on 
the written evidence that they have. They are relying on their powers to 
order a mini-trial on all or some of the issues. In making their decisions 
about whether the issues require a full trial they are asking “will the 
addition of a mini-trial, with whatever processes and procedures it will 
85. Osborne, “Civil Justice Reform,” supra note 49.
86. Matthew Karabus & Ted Tjaden, “The Impact of Hryniak v Mauldin on Summary Judgments 
in Canada One Year Later” (2015) 44:1 The Advocates’ Quarterly 85 at 95. These numbers are also 
an increase in comparison to a study on success rates of summary judgments conducted pre-Hryniak 
by Peter Wells and Adrienne Boudreau. Wells and Boudreau found that the combined success rates 
on summary judgment motions between 2009–2012 was only about 65% (a 55.7% probability of full 
summary judgment, and 9.4% chance of a partial summary judgment being granted). See Peter EJ 
Wells & Adrienne Boudreau, “It was Deja Vu All Over Again” (2013) 42 The Advocates’ Quarterly 86.
87. Karabus & Tjaden, supra note 86 at 95. In 140 of these decisions full summary judgment was 
granted and in 21 decisions partial summary judgment was granted.
88. Richard Foot, “Hryniak Two Years On,” (4 January 2016), online: Canadian Lawyer Mag 
<https://www.canadianlawyermag.com/author/sandra-shutt/hryniak-two-years-on-3133/> [https://
perma.cc/25CY-8Y87].
89. Brooke MacKenzie, “Effecting a Culture Shift—An Empirical Review of Ontario’s Summary 
Judgment Reforms” 54:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 1275 at 1290.
90. Ibid at 1294-1299.
91. Ibid at 1290.
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entail make the resolution of the overall case more ef cient, affordable, 
timely or proportionate?”92 Sometimes they still require a full trial on other 
issues.93 Courts are setting out what material facts are not in dispute and 
de ning the issues to be tried, and ordering that the action proceed to trial 
expeditiously.94 A study conducted by Matthew Karabus and Ted Tjaden 
on the summary judgments at the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, 
however, illustrates that judges do seem less interested in taking up the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s call for judges to remain seized of proceedings 
when summary judgment motions fail.95 They found that in sixty per cent 
of cases where a summary judgment motion failed, the trial judge had 
decided not to remain seized of the matter.96 
There are a number of concerns that have been raised regarding 
summary judgments. The traditional argument is that only a trial with 
oral evidence will allow a full appreciation of the record.97 As a result, 
meritorious claims or defenses might be disposed of too early. In a trial, 
the judge is exposed to the totality of the evidence but parties also get 
the opportunity to present the evidence in the way that they want.98 In 
a summary judgment, the court bases the decision largely on a paper 
record.99 This evidence is not presented in a particular order and there are 
not the same opportunities for asking questions from witnesses to make any 
clari cations.100 In Hryniak, Justice Karakatsanis stated that the process 
needs to be just and fair but weighed this with the fact that individuals are 
being denied the opportunity for adjudication at all.101 Justice Karakatsanis 
suggested that the process can still be just and fair while also being more 
proportionate.102
92. Pinto v Kaur et al, 2014 ONSC 5329 at para 30; Pinto v Kaur et al, 2015 ONSC 1356. See also 
Dr Thomas Dentistry v Bank of Nova Scotia, 2010 ONSC 1227.
93. Premier Dry Cleaning v Burnford, 2017 ONSC 2 at para 68. Justice Corthorn set out the  ndings 
she was able to make based on the written evidence for the  rst issue, ordered a mini-trial on parts of 
issues one and two, ordered a full trial on parts of issues one and two, and dismissed issue three. 
94. Ibid.
95. Hryniak, supra note 2 at para 6. The Court wrote that where a motion judge dismisses a motion 
for summary judgment, they should, if possible, also seize themselves of the proceedings as the trial 
judge.
96. Karabus & Tjaden, supra note 86.
97. Walker, supra note 58 at 711.
98. Combined Air, supra note 75 at para 48.
99. This paper record includes af davits and any other relevant evidence. In Irving Ungerman Ltd 
v Galanis (CA), 1991 4 OR (3d) 545, 83 DLR (4th) 734 for instance, the parties had placed extensive 
af davit and transcript evidence before the court. Although now of course the judge can also call oral 
evidence through the mini trial per R 20.04(2.2).
100. Walker, supra note 58 at 711.
101. Hryniak, supra note 2 at para 29.
102. Ibid.
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Frédéric Bachand, in his article on Quebec’s 2016 civil reform, writes 
that part of the reason for the existing crisis in civil litigation has to do with 
the overly large emphasis that we place in civil litigation on searching for 
truth.103 This search for truth is thought to be the cornerstone of the civil 
justice system. However, Bachand argues that if a principle deserves to 
be the cornerstone of the justice system, it should not be the search for 
truth, but rather the principle of accessibility.104 In the article, Bachand 
applauds the emphasis on access to justice in the new Code (at the time), 
which differed from the previous Code’s emphasis on truth. Bachand 
also references summary judgment, and Justice Karakstanis’ argument in 
Hryniak, that we need a change in culture, as a good example for how to 
 nd an equilibrium between searching for truth and ensuring that the civil 
justice system is accessible.105
A second related concern is that parties will bring forward new causes 
of action and these will be disposed of by way of summary judgment.106
This concern is perhaps warranted. In Wilk v Arbour 2017, for instance, 
Justice Faieta found that it is possible to determine a novel question of law 
on a summary judgment motion.107 If these claims had the chance to go to 
a full trial, then these new causes of actions would be explored in more 
depth. This deeper exploration allows greater development of the common 
law on these questions.108 Additionally, summary judgments have less 
precedential value because they are not based on a full trial. However, 
Justice Karakatsanis in Hryniak observes that if Canadians are not able to 
go to trial because of costs and delays, they will be forced to settle. It is 
possible that this would stunt the common law to a greater extent since in 
a settlement there is no public adjudication and no judgment to be used as 
precedent at all.109 
A third concern is that sometimes a summary judgment does not save, 
and in fact may increase, costs or time since there is always a risk that 
a summary judgment motion will be denied or reversed on appeal.110 In 
Baywood Homes 2014, for instance, Justices Rouleau, Lauwers and van 
Rensburg note that preparing summary judgment motion materials and 
103. Frédéric Bachand, “Les Principes Généraux de la Justice Civile et le Nouveau Code de Procédure 
Civile” (2015) 61 McGill L J at 450. At the time of giving this speech Bachand was an associate 
professor in the Faculty of Law at McGill. He is now a judge of the Superior Court of Quebec. 
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid at 454. 
106. Osborne, “Civil Justice Reform,” supra note 49.
107. Wilk v Arbour, 2017 ONCA 21.
108. Osborne, “Civil Justice Reform,” supra note 49.
109. Hryniak, supra note 2 at para 1.
110. Osborne, “Civil Justice Reform,” supra note 49.
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cross-examinations might not provide savings over an ordinary discovery 
process and trial, especially if the summary judgment motion is dismissed 
and a trial occurs anyway.111 Sometimes nothing can be salvaged from 
the expensive and time-consuming summary judgment process.112 For 
summary judgments to operate fairly this is a necessary sacri ce. However, 
this additional time defeats the purpose of the summary judgment.113
Another concern is that people will use summary judgment as a litigation 
tactic to unduly delay the  nal resolution of a case. As Justice Karakstanis 
notes in Hryniak, judges can and should try and control these risks, through 
such avenues as trial management powers114 and inherent jurisdiction, and 
lawyers should act in a way that facilitates access to justice.115  
Despite these concerns, however, evidence seems to suggest the 
positive potential for summary judgments and an increase in summary 
judgments being granted in the province of Ontario. 
3. Quebec’s new Code of Civil Procedure 2016
In Quebec, Bill 28, An Act to Establish the New Code of Civil Procedure, 
was introduced in 2013, received assent 21 February 2014, and came into 
force on 1 January 2016 .116 The Bill led to 330 amendments and  ve sub-
amendments to Quebec’s Code of Civil Procedure. Previous amendments 
had been made to the Code in 2002 and 2009. This was, however, the 
 rst major reform of the Code since 1965. The Preliminary Provision of 
Bill 28 explains what the reformed Code was designed to ensure.117 This 
includes the accessibility and promptness of justice, the proportionate and 
economical application of procedural rules, and the inculcation of a spirit 
of cooperation in the exercise of parties’ rights.118 
The reform recommendations made in Quebec and Ontario were 
speci c to each province, but in comparing Quebec and Ontario, there are a 
number of reform changes that cut across both jurisdictions.119 For example, 
both Quebec and Ontario legislated reforms to ensure proportionality in 
111. Baywood Homes Partnership v Haditaghi, 2014 ONCA 450 at 44-45.
112. Ibid at 44-45. 
113. Ibid at 45.
114. Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 6 at R 20.05.
115. Hryniak, supra note 2 at paras 32 and 74. 
116. Bill n°28: An Act to establish the new Code of Civil Procedure—National Assembly of Quebec, 
21 February 2014 [Bill n°28].
117. Explanatory Notes and Preliminary Provision, Bill 28 (2014, c. 1): An Act to establish the new 
Code of Civil Procedure at para 2.
118. Ibid. 
119. Jukier, “Microcosm of Mixity,” supra note 10 at 719.
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procedures,120 encourage out of court settlement121 and put in place case 
management by judges.122 One major difference between the reforms in 
the two jurisdictions was that summary judgment rules in Ontario were 
expanded, while in Quebec summary judgment was not introduced. 
IV. Summary judgment equivalents in Quebec?
As was mentioned at the outset of this paper, the Court in Hryniak, asserts 
in a footnote that Quebec has procedural devices that could be likened 
to summary judgment.123 In this section, I explore the accuracy of that 
claim. I illustrate that there is no historical basis for summary judgment in 
Quebec and that it was not even contemplated by the Quebec legislature 
in drafting the new Code. I then look at four articles—articles 219, 54.1 
et seq. (now 51 et seq.), 165 (now 168), and 154 et seq.—that have been 
suggested as possible equivalents to summary judgment. I demonstrate 
that when examined carefully, it is evident that these are not functional 
equivalents to summary judgment as it exists in Ontario. Furthermore, two 
Quebec judgments af rm that there is no equivalent to summary judgment 
in Quebec.
1. No history of summary judgment in Quebec
The  rst indicator that there are no functional equivalents to summary 
judgment in Quebec is that, as mentioned in the history of summary 
procedure section of this paper, there is no historical record of summary 
judgment in Quebec in any civil procedure prior to the version of the 
Code of Civil Procedure referred to in Hryniak.124 Instead, Quebec had a 
summary procedure that was based on the summary procedure that existed 
in France, and is different from summary judgment altogether. 
While there has been no summary judgment in Quebec, or in 
France’s history, this does not mean that there are no summary judgment 
equivalents now, especially given the fact that Quebec’s legal system has 
been characterized as a mixed system and has been in uenced by the 
Common Law legal tradition. Professor Rosalie Jukier remarks in her 
120. In Quebec the principle of proportionality is reinforced in art 18(1) and (2) CCP. In Ontario 
it appears in R 1.04(1), R 29.2 (in the context of discovery) and R 76 (in the context of simpli ed 
procedure).  
121. In Quebec see e.g. arts 1(3), and generally arts 1-7, 9(2), 148 para 1 (parties have to indicate 
that they considered private dispute prevention and resolution processes), and 161 et seq. of CCP. In 
Ontario see e.g. R 24.1 and R 49.10.
122. In Quebec see e.g. arts 9(2), 9, and 158 CCP. In Ontario see e.g. R 77. 
123. Hryniak, supra note 2 at para 20. 
124. Curran, supra note 32; Clark & Samenow, supra note 18 at 439-440. Clark and Samenow cite 
two cases at 439 footnote 125 that exemplify this procedure in practice. See Davis v Chauvette 27 Que 
PR 207; Riddell v Vipond 27 Que PR 308 (1924).
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article on the 2016 Code of Civil Procedure Reforms that the judge’s role 
in the recent Code seems to move Quebec’s civil justice system closer to 
a civilian approach to civil procedure.125 By this, she means that judges 
have increased power in the civil process. Even though she argues that 
this shift pertains only to the judge’s role, it could be argued that changing 
the judge’s role is indicative of a larger conceptual shift in Quebec civil 
procedure back to a more civilian conception. It seems likely, therefore, 
that given that summary judgment has not been part of the civilian 
tradition, a functional equivalent does not exist in the Quebec Code of 
Civil Procedure. 
2. No summary judgment introduced by the Quebec Legislature
Additionally, the Quebec legislator did not consider summary judgment 
in drafting the new Code. There is no mention of summary judgment in 
the draft bill tabled in September 2011,126 or in the second draft bill, Bill 
28, tabled in April 2013,127 which eventually became the basis for the new 
Code of Civil Procedure. In the transcripts from the public consultations 
on the  rst bill and the public consultations on Bill 28, there is no 
mention of summary judgment.128 Starting in October 2013 and ending in 
February 2014 when Bill 28 was passed, the Parliamentary Committee on 
Institutions conducted a detailed examination of the bill for 30 sittings.129
Again, summary judgment is not discussed in the transcripts from these 
sittings. In the early drafts of the new Code of Civil Procedure, in the 
transcripts from the public consultations for both bills, and in the detailed 
examination of Bill 28, allowing summary judgments is not discussed as a 
goal of any of the articles. Summary judgments in other provinces are also 
not referenced. It is very unlikely that the Quebec legislature would have 
created a functional equivalent to summary judgment without discussing 
summary judgment as it exists in other provinces. 
125. Jukier, “Microcosm of Mixity,” supra note 10 at 699.
126. The draft bill was tabled by the Minister of Justice at the time Jean-Marc Fournier. 
127. Bill n°28 was tabled by Minister of Justice at the time Bertrand St-Arnaud. 
128. For the  rst bill, public consultations were conducted in January and February 2012. Forty-nine 
briefs were submitted by the public. A  nal report gives an overview of who came forward at the 
public hearing. For Bill n°28, supra note 116, there was a special consultation and public hearings 
in September 2013. Twenty-one briefs were submitted by the public, and as with the prior bill a  nal 
report was published.  
129. A list of amendments taken out, a list of amendments adopted, and a report that gives an overview 
of the examination are all available. 
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3. No functional equivalents to the summary judgment in principle and 
in practice
Third, there are four articles, 209, 51 et seq. (previously 54.1), 168 
(previously 165) and 154, that, on the surface, look like they might function 
like summary judgment. When these articles are examined more closely in 
terms of how they operate in practice, it becomes evident that these are not 
functional equivalents of the summary judgment. 
a. Article 209 
The  rst of these articles that looks similar to part of Rule 20 is Article 
209. Article 209 allows the parties to jointly submit a controversy on 
an issue of law to the court. A court will decide the issue in the course 
of the proceedings if it believes that that will be useful for the “orderly 
progress of the proceeding.” Article 209 looks somewhat similar to Rule 
20.04(4), which sets out that when the court  nds that the only genuine 
issue requiring trial is a question of law then a judge can grant judgment 
accordingly. Article 209, however, applies only when there is an issue of 
law. The other sections of Rule 20 allow for summary judgment on issues 
of fact, and mixed fact and law, in addition to issues of law. This would 
make Article 209 only a partial equivalent to summary judgment. 
A more convincing reason why Article 209 is not a functional 
equivalent to summary judgment is that summary judgment in Ontario 
is an adversarial procedure, whereas Article 209 is not. Unlike with Rule 
20,130 when invoking Article 209 both parties have to agree to submit the 
issue to the court. Article 209  nds a much closer equivalent in Rule 21. 131
Rule 21 provides that a party can ask a judge to rule on a question of law 
prior to trial. In Article 209 a court will determine the issue if it is “useful 
for the orderly progress of the proceeding.” This is similar to Rule 21.01(1)
(a) where a party can move for the determination of a question of law, 
before trial, “where the determination of the question may dispose of all 
or part of the action, substantially shorten the trial or result in a substantial 
saving of costs.” It is worth noting, however, that Rule 21 might still be 
potentially more adversarial than Article 209. 
b. Articles 51 et seq. (previously 54.1) and Article 168 (previously 165)
Articles 51 et seq. (previously 54.1)132 and Article 168 (previously 165)133
are the articles in the Quebec Code that were raised by the Court in Hryniak 
130. See speci cally Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 6 at R 20.01.
131. Ibid at R 21.01(1)(a).
132. Bill n°28 Arts 54.1 to 56.6 were introduced on 4 June 2009 as part of a small set of amendments 
to the Code made prior to the changes introduced in January of 2016.
133. Speci cally, the court in Hryniak compared article 165(4) to the summary judgment. 
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as possible equivalents to summary judgment.134 Articles 54.1 et seq., 
now 51 et seq., give the court the power, either on request or on its own 
initiative, to declare a judicial application or pleading abusive by assessing 
the pleadings and exhibits in the record, and the transcripts of any pre-trial 
examinations.135 The use of procedure is considered improper if a claim 
or pleading is “clearly unfounded, frivolous or dilatory” or if the conduct 
is “vexatious or quarrelsome.” Procedural impropriety can also “consist 
in bad faith, in a use of procedure that is excessive or unreasonable or 
causes prejudice to another person, or in an attempt to defeat the ends of 
justice, in particular if it restricts freedom of expression in public debate.” 
Pursuant to former Article 54.2, now Article 52, a party is only required 
to establish summarily that an action or pleading is an improper use of 
procedure; then the onus shifts to the party initiating the action or pleading 
to show that it is not excessive or unreasonable.
The court is given a variety of powers if it  nds an improper use of 
procedure including: dismissing the judicial application or rejecting a 
pleading, refusing to allow an examination, or cancelling a subpoena. The 
court can also impose conditions on any further steps, require undertakings 
from the party concerned, stay the proceeding, recommend special case 
management or order a provision for costs.136 Article 54.4, now Article 54, 
gives the court the power to order a provision for costs to be reimbursed 
or even to condemn a party to pay damages, including punitive damages, 
for the prejudice suffered by another party.137 Article 54.1 et seq. has 
since been replaced by Article 51 et seq. which operate similarly to their 
predecessors. Whereas Article 54.1 et seq. were concerned with “improper” 
actions or pleadings, the wording of 51 et seq. has changed to “abusive” 
applications or pleadings. However, “abuse of procedure” is de ned in the 
same way that “improper” was; it refers to applications or pleadings that 
are unfounded or frivolous. Thus, the new Code continues, in principle, 
the upshot of the previous provisions. 
Former Article 165 allowed a defendant to ask for an action to be 
dismissed for various reasons including “if the suit is unfounded in law 
even if the facts alleged are true.”138 This has since become Article 168, 
which allows a party to ask that an application or defence be dismissed 
on a number of grounds such as lis pendens, res judicata, if one of the 
134. It was noted in particular that article 54.1 looked narrower than a summary judgment on its face 
but is nonetheless like a summary judgment. See Hryniak, supra note 2 at footnote 4. 
135. Bill n°28 Art 52 para 2 CCP.
136. Bill n°28 Art 53 para 2 (1)(2)(3)(4) and (5) CCP.
137. Ibid at Art 54.4. E.g. Damages can be for fees and extrajudicial costs incurred by that party.
138. Ibid at Art 165(4).
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parties is incapable, or one of the parties has no interest. Most relevant 
here is paragraph 2 where a party can ask to dismiss an application if it is 
unfounded in law (e.g. because it is prescribed), even if the facts alleged 
are true. Unlike previous Article 165, this is not limited to the defendant. 
The only similarity that articles 51 et seq. and 168 share with summary 
judgment is that both articles allow a judge to make a pre-trial assessment 
based on the evidence submitted by the parties. While it was not clear 
under 54.1 et seq. what powers the court had in terms of evidence, and 
on what basis they made their decision, the new articles (51 et seq.), 
that replaced 54.1, bring increased clarity.139 Under the new Article 52 
paragraph 2, the court has to make its decision based on the following: 
the pleadings themselves, exhibits in the record, transcripts of any pre-
trial examinations and the initiator’s oral arguments that the application 
or pleading is not excessive or unreasonable. Paragraph 2 then goes on 
to say that “no other evidence is presented, unless the court considers it 
necessary.” This seems to suggest that the court has the authority to order 
other evidence. Since this provision does not set out the extent of the other 
evidence that the court could ask to be presented, this might give the court 
similar powers under Article 52 as they get through rules 20.04(2.1 and 
2.2). 
Despite these small similarities, the argument that Article 51 et seq., 
and Article 168 are functional equivalents to Ontario’s summary judgment 
is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, under Article 51 et seq. a judge 
looks for abuse of process, and under article 168 a judge looks for whether 
the claim discloses no cause of action. Abuse of process and decisions on 
cause of action are not the chief function of summary judgment. Under Rule 
20, a judge looks to see whether there is a “genuine issue requiring trial.” 
It is possible that there may be no genuine issue requiring trial because 
a pleading is simply an attempt to abuse the system. Similarly, a judge 
might  nd that there is no genuine issue for trial because the application 
is unfounded in law. Determining whether an application is abusive or 
unfounded in law is a different investigation than determining whether 
there is a genuine issue requiring trial. Summary judgment would not be 
the obvious mechanism for dismissal for abuse of process or because an 
application is unfounded in law. There are situations where there is no 
139. Bill n°28, supra note 116, Art 54.1 only says that “the onus is on the initiator of the action 
or pleading to show that it is not excessive or unreasonable and is justi ed in law.” However, in 
Wood Gundy, supra note 170 at para 4, the evidence that the court relies on includes: transcripts from 
interrogations of two provincial trustees who oversaw the material goods of the Dominicains, and a 
number of exhibits. 
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issue requiring trial where the pleading is not abusive, and/or unfounded 
in law. 
Second, Article 51 et seq. and Article 168 are pre-trial motions to 
dismiss.140 In looking at the older interpretation of summary judgment prior 
to Hryniak, in cases like Lameman 2008141 and Combined Air 2010,142 it 
is more evident why articles 54.1 and 165(4) might have been likened to 
summary judgment.143 In Lameman, for instance, the Supreme Court of 
Canada makes it clear that the bar to dismiss a case on summary judgment 
is high. The purpose of summary judgment is described as weeding out 
claims that were bound to fail at the preliminary stage.144 This bore a much 
closer resemblance to a motion to dismiss. As the summary judgment rules 
and their interpretation have expanded, it is clear that summary judgment 
is meant to allow parties to receive a judgment without a full trial, where 
a full trial is not required. This is a different goal than that of articles 54.1 
and 165(4). 
Further evidence that these articles are not equivalents to Rule 20 is 
that Ontario has direct functional equivalents to both 51 et seq. and 168. 
Rules 2.1.01 and 25.11(c) of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure deal 
speci cally with abuse of process, as do the recently revived Strategic 
Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP) rules, 137.1 et seq., in the 
Courts of Justice Act.145 Article 21.01(1)(b) of the Ontario Rules of Civil 
Procedure allows a party to move before a judge to strike out a pleading 
that discloses no reasonable cause of action or defense, similar to Article 
168. The fact that Ontario has these other rules makes it clear that Rule 20 
was meant to ful ll a different purpose. 
c. Article 154
A  nal article that has not been suggested as a functional equivalent to 
summary judgment, and yet looks like summary judgment, is Article 154. 
Article 154 is found under the Case Management Conference section 
140. Although Bill n°28 Art 53 allows the court to do more than just dismiss the judicial application. 
The court is given a whole range of powers including rejecting a pleading, striking out a conclusion, 
imposing conditions on further steps in the judicial application, recommending that special case 
management be ordered, etc. 
141. A case arising out of Alberta. See Lameman, supra note 62.
142. Combined Air, supra note 75.
143. Hryniak, supra note 2 at footnote 4. 
144. Lameman, supra note 62 at para 10. 
145. Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c 43 at 137.1ff [CJA]. SLAPP lawsuits are suits that are brought 
by people in order to try to censor or intimidate critics. Section 137.1 gives defendants of SLAPP suits 
a mechanism to get those suits dismissed in a faster and less costly way. See Kevin O’Brien, & Louis 
Tsilivis, “Ontario Court of Appeal clari es test under ‘anti-SLAPP’ legislation,” (31 August 2018), 
online: Osler <http://www.osler.com/en/resources/regulations/2018/ontario-court-of-appeal-clari es-
test-under-anti-slapp-legislation> [https://perma.cc/P983-3GDN].
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of the Code. Following the 2016 changes to the Code, parties have to 
establish a case protocol after a judicial demand has been  led.146 The case 
protocol has to be approved, and if it is not the parties will be called to 
a case management conference within 20 days.147 The case management 
conference is convened at the court’s initiative, but also can be convened 
on request of the parties.148 During the case management conference, the 
court “acquaints itself with the issues of fact or law in dispute, examines 
the case protocol, discusses it with the parties and takes the appropriate 
case management measures.”149 Case management protocols include 
taking measures to simplify or expedite proceedings, imposing joint 
expert evidence, and determining the terms for how pre-trial examinations 
should be conducted.150 The court can issue case management orders at 
any point, not just at the case management conference, to ensure that the 
case is progressing adequately and in conformity with the principle of 
proportionality.151 
With that context in mind, Article 154 states: 
At the case management conference, the court may decide to hold 
a hearing of the parties, on the preliminary exceptions, or to hear 
the defendant on the grounds of defence, which are recorded in the 
minutes of the hearing or in a brief statement. The court may try the 
case immediately if the defence is to be oral and the parties are ready to 
proceed, postpone the hearing to a speci ed later date or leave it to the 
court clerk to set the case down for trial.
Preliminary exceptions are presented and contested orally, but the court 
may authorize the parties to submit the relevant evidence.
This article suggests  rst, that the court may decide to hold a hearing on the 
preliminary exceptions or hear the defendant on the grounds of defence. 
A preliminary exception might include, for instance, a party asking that 
an application, or defence, be dismissed on the basis of there being lis 
pendens (a pending legal action) or res judicata (the matter already having 
been adjudicated by a competent court).152 Paragraph one further provides 
that the court can decide to try the case immediately if the defence is going 
to be oral and the parties are ready to proceed, or they can postpone the 
hearing to a speci ed later date, or let the court clerk set the case down 
146. Bill n°28 Art 148 CCP. 
147. Ibid, Art 150 CCP. 
148. Ibid, Art 153 CCP. 
149. Ibid, Art 153 CCP. 
150. Ibid, Art 158 CCP.
151. Ibid, Art 18 CCP. 
152. Ibid, Arts 168 and 169 CCP. 
Searching for a Summary Judgment Equivalent 233
in Quebec Procedural Law
for trial. Paragraph two clari es that preliminary exceptions are presented 
and contested orally, however, it gives the court the power to authorize the 
parties to submit the relevant evidence. 
The second part of paragraph one is potentially similar to summary 
judgment. It is possible that it could be interpreted as a further explanation 
of the  rst part of the article dealing with preliminary exceptions. It might 
simply indicate that the court can immediately hear the parties on the 
preliminary exceptions if the defence will be oral and the parties are ready 
to proceed, or it can postpone this to a later date, or set the case down for 
trial. However, the latter element regarding setting the case down for trial 
does not  t, since the parties would not proceed to trial without hearing 
the preliminary exceptions. Additionally, Article 155 continues from 154. 
It explains how the parties can prove their cases “if the court tries the 
application on the same day as the case management conference.”153 This 
further suggests that the court is trying the case. 
Another interpretation is that Article 154 and seq. are functional 
equivalents to summary judgment. Article 154 and seq. are similar to 
summary judgment because,  rst, they give the court the power to decide 
that the case should be tried in an expedited way, much like summary 
judgment in Ontario. As Article 154 indicates, the court can try the case 
immediately, if the parties are ready and the defence is to be oral.154 Second, 
Article 155 suggests that the judgment is rendered based on the same kinds 
of evidence that the court relies on to come to a summary judgment in 
Ontario. Article 155 explains that if the court tries the application on the 
same day as the case management conference “the parties prove their cases 
by means of af davits” and they can also present other evidence, such as 
testimonial or documentary evidence. The use, by parties, of af davits to 
prove their case parallels the use of af davits on a motion for summary 
judgment under the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure.155 The ability to 
present testimonial or documentary evidence in addition to af davits is 
also similar to the Ontario rules such as the ability of a judge to order oral 
evidence.156 
Existing case law is not especially helpful in illuminating whether 
Article 154 et seq. functions like summary judgment in practice. Eighteen 
Quebec cases cite Article 154. Most of these cases deal with preliminary 
153. Ibid, Art 155 CCP.
154. Ibid, Art 154(1) CCP. The court can also postpone the hearing to a speci ed later date.
155. Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 6 at R 20.02.
156. Ibid, R 20.04(2.2).
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exceptions157 and issues with the case management process .158 Other cases 
simply cite Article 154 in passing .159 Two cases mention the power of the 
court, under article 154(1), to try the case immediately or postpone the 
hearing to a speci ed later date. The  rst case, Desjardins du Bassin-de-
Chambly 2018, is not particularly helpful in illustrating whether Article 
154 et seq. function like summary judgment in practice .160 In Desjardins, 
the main issue had to do with whether the court could proceed directly 
to a hearing or postpone a hearing (Article 154) without a case protocol. 
The court held that the proceedings could not go forward without a case 
protocol.161 
A second case, Ville de Montréal c. Giammarella, 2019162 is an 
illustration of the court proceeding immediately to a hearing at a case 
management conference, when there was no defence to request, and the 
parties were ready to proceed.163 Here, the court reviewed the af davit for 
amounts that were owed by the defendant to the City of Montreal. The 
157. 9361-1606 Quebec inc c Gracia, 2018 QCCS 2923 (defendant argued that the plaintiff lacked 
capacity to bring the case); Curateur public du Quebec c NV, 2019 QCCQ 1120 (dealt with a variety 
of preliminary exceptions). 
158. 9268-9579 Quebec inc c 9222-0797 Quebec inc, 2017 QCCA 129 (did not  le the case protocol 
in time); Innovtech Construction Inc. c. Simtec Group 3000 Inc, 2017 QCCQ 14879 [9268-9579 
Quebec] (plaintiff was supposed to have applied for registration for trial and judgment no later than 
6 months from the date of service of the originating motion but did not); Family Law - 171995 2017 
QCCS 3859, 2017 QCCS 3859 (defendant argued impossibility to act); Sherbrooke (City of) c Pierre-
Louis, 2016 QCCS 4936 (plaintiff had  led a draft protocol which was sent to the respondent who did 
not respond and did not attend a case management session); Sigmasanté c Crane Canada Co, 2017 
QCCQ 1190 (dealt with a request to reject a second expert report); Bank of Montreal c Bannerpen 
inc 2016 QCCQ 4569 (defendants were absent without reason at the case management conference); 
Nadeau c Surprising 2018 QCCS 1093 (defendant had not sought leave to  le a written defense under 
Arts 154 and 170 CCP); Crête c Centre hospitalier de l’Université de Montréal, 2018 QCCS 1097 
(again, defendant had not sought leave to  le a written defence under arts 154 and 170 CCP); Groupe 
Anderson inc. c. CGAO, 2017 QCCS 4940 (dealt with rules about the summary statement provided 
for in Arts 154 and 170 being a maximum of 30 lines); Corporation Investissements IIC / Individual 
Investment Corporation c Kayemba Kasuku, 2017 QCCS 4210 (Art 154 CCP quoted in discussion of 
the fact that defence must be oral).
159. 9279-2092 Quebec inc (LG4 Isolation) c Investissements St-Patrick inc, 2018 QCCS 1753 
(article was referenced but not applied); 9118-3186 Quebec inc c Moneris Solutions Corporation, 
2017 QCCS 2657 (again, article was referenced but not applied); KSA Avocats c Ri P 2016 QCCQ 
14756 [KSA Avocats] (dealt with a default judgment).
160. Caisse populaire Desjardins du Bassin-de-Chambly c The Squire, 2018 QCCS 5145 [Desjardins].
161. Ibid at para 1: « Considérant que l’article 154 C.p.c., premier alinéa, invoqué par l’avocat de la 
demanderesse qui permet au tribunal d’entendre le défendeur sur les motifs de sa contestation puis de 
procéder immédiatement à l’instruction ou de reporter l’audience à une autre date ne s’applique qu’à 
la conférence de gestion pour l’examen du protocole de l’instance convoquée par le tribunal en vertu 
de l’article 153 C.p.c. ».
162. Ville de Montréal c. Giammarella, 2019 QCCQ 67 [Giammarella].
163. Ibid at para 4: « Vu l’article 154 du Code de procédure civile (C.p.c.) qui permet au Tribunal de 
procéder immédiatement à l’instruction lors d’une Conférence de gestion si, notamment, il n’y a aucun 
moyen de défense à la demande introductive et les parties sont prêtes à procéder ».
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defendant (Giammarella) acknowledged that she would not contest the 
application, and so the court welcomed the request to proceed directly to 
a hearing and condemned Giammarella to pay the sum ($34,680.27) with 
interest to the City of Montreal, and an additional indemnity.164 The use of 
Article 154 et seq. resembles a summary judgment in that the court decided 
that there was no reason to proceed to trial (i.e. “no genuine issue for 
trial”), expedited the trial, and came to a judgment based on the af davits. 
This case, however, was particularly simple to decide since the defendant 
did not contest the application. If cases can only be decided summarily in 
Quebec when they are this straightforward, then this is much more limited 
than summary judgment in Ontario. 
Finally, KSA Avocats c Ri P 2017 is one of the cases that cited Article 
154 in passing.165 This case did not deal with proceeding directly to a 
hearing. However, in the context of discussing the legal consequences of 
a case management conference, Justice Brunelle comments on articles 
154 and 155. He explains that the point of a case management conference 
is to manage the case, and that articles 154 and 155 allow the court to 
manage the case by trying it immediately,166 on the same day as the case 
management conference.167  
At this point, although Article 154 et seq. resemble summary 
judgment, the case law is so limited that it does not give us a sense of 
whether these articles operate like summary judgment in practice. 
Desjardins, Giammarella, and the comments made as an aside by Justice 
Brunelle in KSA Avocats con rm that the court can decide to try a case 
expediently, but this is already stated in the text of Article 154. The cases 
also do not give any indication of whether there are other factors that the 
court might consider in deciding to proceed to trial right away, other than 
that the defence must be oral and the parties must be ready to proceed.168
It is unclear, for instance, what makes the parties “ready to proceed.”169
While, Giammarella is a largely paper hearing like the Ontario summary 
judgment, this is only one case that was particularly straightforward (since 
Giammarella did not contest the application). It is impossible to draw any 
164. Ibid at para 9. 
165. Ibid. 
166. KSA Avocats, supra note 159 at para 62.
167. Ibid at para 63: « L’article 155 C.p.c. mentionne clairement que le tribunal peut instruire « la 
demande le jour même de la conférence », que les parties peuvent y faire leur preuve « au moyen de 
déclarations sous serment lorsque la loi l’exige ou le permet », de même que « présenter toute autre 
preuve, par témoignage ou par présentation d’un document ».
168. Bill n°28 Art 154(1) CCP.
169. Ibid. 
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conclusions about whether Article 154 looks like summary judgment in 
practice. 
4. Quebec judgments on summary judgment post-Hryniak af rm that 
there is no functional equivalent
Two Quebec cases post-Hryniak have further explored the question of 
whether summary judgment exists in Quebec. In the  rst case, Ordre des 
Dominicains c. CIBC Wood Gundy 2014, Ordre des Dominicains argued 
that CIBC Wood Gundy had mismanaged their securities portfolio and 
did not meet their investment objectives. CIBC tried to have the action 
dismissed on the ground of prescription by using former Article 54.1 (and 
former Article 165). They also relied on Hryniak and asked the judge 
for a summary judgment in their favour. Yergeau J argues that articles 
like 54.1 do not seem to be born from the will of the legislator to endow 
Quebec justices with the power to grant a summary judgment.170 Justice 
Yergeau states that one only has to read Rule 20 of the Ontario Rules of 
Civil Procedure to be convinced that there is no equivalent in Quebec. 
The provisions in other provinces that allow for summary judgment were 
developed with the express goal of putting in place a system of summary 
judgment in those provinces.171 Af rming earlier arguments, Yergeau, J 
asserts that, instead, this article seems to have been created with the goal 
of preventing gag lawsuits and SLAPP suits.172
Justice Yergeau further explains that Rule 20 provides an elaborate 
procedure and is a summary determination of whether there is a real 
contentious issue requiring trial.173 He notes that while the court can be 
fully committed to Hryniak’s objective that a cultural shift is required to 
create an environment conducive to expeditious and affordable access to 
the justice system, this does not permit the judge to turn Article 54.1 into 
a summary judgment clause.174 
Justice Yergeau also mentions the case that is used in Hryniak to 
support the idea that summary judgment exists in Quebec. This case is 
Bal Global Finance Canada Corporation c. Aliments Breton (Canada) 
Inc. 2010, in which Justice La Rosa conducted a thorough analysis of the 
170. Ordre des dominicains ou frères prêcheurs au Canada (ODD) c CIBC Wood Gundy inc (WG), 
2014 QCCS 367 at para 42 [Wood Gundy].
171. For example, as previously discussed, the Osborne Report which prompted civil reform in 
Ontario, was expressly trying to create a summary judgment mechanism that would be used more 
often. 
172. Similar to CJA, supra note 145 at 137.1ff.
173. Wood Gundy, supra note 170 at para 32.
174. Ibid at para 44. 
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evidence on a motion under Article 54.1 before granting the motion.175
This is similar to summary judgment, as this analysis of evidence was 
used in coming to a decision about whether to grant the motion. What the 
footnote fails to mention, however, is that this judgment was subsequently 
overturned by the Quebec Court of Appeal, which emphasized that the 
analysis should have been undertaken at trial.176
The second Quebec case that has explored the issue of whether 
summary judgment exists in Quebec is Struthers c. Régie des marchés 
agricoles et alimentaires du Quebec 2015.177 Struthers was a cattle 
producer in Quebec. In four  les they contested a series of decisions 
made by the Régie des marchés agricoles et alimentaire du Quebec (the 
“Régie”) and special contribution payment orders made by the Quebec 
Federation of Cattle Producers (the “Federation”). A few months after 
serving the applications for review on the Régie and the Federation, they 
submitted an application for review to the Attorney General of Quebec 
accompanied by a notice that they planned to contest le Règlement sur les 
contributions des producteurs de bovins on constitutional grounds. The 
Federation and the Attorney General of Quebec sought the dismissal of 
the applications for review. Among the articles they cited were articles 
54.1 and 165 of the Code of Civil Procedure.178 Ultimately Justice Brian 
Riordan found that Struthers’ behaviour constituted an abuse of procedure 
and rejected the applications for review in the four  les. On the topic of 
summary judgment, Justice Riordan remarks that he recognizes that the 
decision in Hryniak is based on a procedural rule that does not exist in 
Quebec.179 He notes, however, that this is not an obstacle to embracing the 
cultural shift referred to by the Supreme Court in Hryniak. He remarks 
that the principles of proportionality and the active management of cases 
have been facets of Quebec legal culture for a long time.180 Alongside the 
duty of Quebec courts to hear the merits of a case is the duty of judges to 
also actively manage the  les before them. This case provides a perfect 
example where the cultural shift discussed in Hryniak forces the court to 
intervene.181
175. Bal Global Finance Canada Corporation c Aliments Breton (Canada) Inc, 2010 QCCS 325.
176. Aliments Breton (Canada) inc c Bal Global Finance Canada Corporation, 2010 QCCA 1369
[Bal Global]. For further discussion of Hryniak, overlooking the problems with Bal Global as a source 
for summary judgment in Quebec, see also Wood Gundy, supra note 170 at para 39.
177. Struthers c Régie des marchés agricoles et alimentaires du Quebec, 2015 QCCS 5992 [Struthers].
178. In addition to Arts 54.1 and 165, they cited Arts 20, 33, and 846 Old CCP.
179. Wood Gundy, supra note 170 at para 71.
180. Ibid. Justice Riordan observes in footnote 29 that article 54.1 serves as an example of that.
181. Ibid at para 72. 
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There are several possible interpretations of this judgment. It could 
be interpreted to mean that even though summary judgment does not 
exist in Quebec, judges in Quebec can use existing procedural tools, like 
Article 54.1, to essentially create a summary judgment procedure in order 
to embrace the cultural shift called for by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
Justice Riordan’s observation that active management is a long-recognized 
facet of Quebec’s legal system supports the belief that summary judgment 
 ts well into Quebec civil procedure, and so it might well exist, but under 
the guise of something else, like Article 54.1 et seq. Another interpretation, 
and the one that seems most likely, is that Justice Riordan was stating that 
judges can use Quebec’s civil procedural tools to embrace the cultural 
shift through tools unique to Quebec. This is supported by the fact that 
when he wrote that Quebec legal culture embodies the principles of active 
case management, he seemed to be discussing the culture in a broad way. 
He did not seem to suggest that this can be achieved through manipulating 
an existing article to act like summary judgment, or that there is an 
equivalent. He was simply suggesting that Quebec law embodies this 
principle. Thus, both Wood Gundy and Struthers, ultimately seem to posit 
that Quebec does not have functional equivalents of summary judgment, 
but that Quebec approaches the issue in a different way.
V. Quebec’s unique procedural tools
While Ontario has focused on summary judgment as a means of achieving 
access to justice, the 2016 Quebec Code of Civil Procedure introduced 
its own unique tools to deal with the problem. Many of these tools do 
not have an equivalent in Ontario, or the Ontario rules have a variation 
in their approach. As Justice Riordan writes in Struthers, the court can 
embrace the cultural shift referred to in Hryniak through these tools.182
These tools can achieve some of the same goals as summary judgment 
without some of the disadvantages that have been noted. Some examples 
that give judges more control over the case and streamline the process 
include the introduction of the case protocol, case management powers, 
and encouragement of joint experts. 
As mentioned, the parties have to cooperate to create a case protocol 
within 45 days from service of the summons.183 In the case protocol, parties 
have to set out their agreements and undertakings, the issues in dispute, 
and the steps they plan to take to ensure the proceeding operates smoothly. 
If they plan to seek separate rather than joint expert opinions, they need to 
182. Struthers, supra note 177 at paras 71-72.
183. Bill n°28 Art 149 CCP. Unless the case deals with family matters in which case it must be  led 
within three months after service of the summons per Art 149 para 2 CCP. 
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explain why.184 They must also create deadlines to be ready for trial within 
the 6-month timeline.185 Parties also have to illustrate that they considered 
alternative dispute resolution processes. The court examines the case 
protocol and if the court does not approve it, the parties are called, within 
20 days, to a case management conference.186 The court also possesses 
case management powers, as discussed in the previous section, which it 
can use at any stage of the proceedings whether by its own initiative, or 
on request.187 
Ontario’s only similar mechanism to the case protocol is the province’s 
discovery plan, which requires parties to agree to and set out in writing the 
scope of what the discovery will entail.188 This includes when each party 
will serve their af davit of documents, the timing and manner for delivering 
documents, and the names of people who will give oral examinations.189
Unlike the case protocol, which deals with the entire case, the discovery 
plan only deals with when discovery will take place and its form. 
Ontario has pre-trial conferences, which are somewhat similar 
to Quebec’s case management conferences. Unlike Quebec’s case 
management conferences, however, these are mandatory and occur within 
180 days after an action is set down for trial, which is considerably later 
in time than case management conferences in Quebec.190 At pre-trial 
conferences, the court can consider matters such as the possibility of 
settlement on any, or all, of the issues, simplifying the issues, the estimated 
duration of the trial, and whether the court should appoint an expert.191 This 
provides an opportunity to settle issues without a hearing. For those issues 
that are not settled, the court will provide orders to assist in resolving the 
case in the most expeditious and cost-effective way possible.192 Quebec 
also has pre-trial conferences that can be called by the judge’s initiative, 
or on request, in order to bring together the lawyers to discuss ways of 
“simplifying and shortening the trial.”193 
Ontario has a case management system that gives courts an expansive 
set of powers over cases in this track.194 The expansiveness of these powers 
184. Ibid, Art 148(4) CCP.
185. Ibid, Art 173 CCP.
186. Ibid, Art 150 CCP.
187. Ibid, Art 158 CCP.
188. Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 6 at R 29.1.03(2).
189. Ibid, R 29.1.03(3).
190. Ibid, R 50.02(1).
191. Ibid, R 50.06.
192. Ibid, R 50.01; R 50.07(1).
193. Bill n°28 Art 179 CCP. 
194. Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 6 at R 77.
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resemble, in some ways, the case management powers given to Quebec 
courts.195 However, in Quebec all cases are managed by the court,196
while the Ontario case management system only applies to civil actions 
commenced in Toronto, Ottawa, and Essex county (Windsor).197 The 
system provides for case management only when it is demonstrated that 
the proceedings need the court’s intervention, and the case is only managed 
“to the degree that is appropriate.”198 A judge or case management master 
has to assign a civil case to this track. A case will be assigned to this track 
if the parties agree to it and a judge or case manager decides that the case 
is suitable for it,199 if a judge or case manager assigns it on his or her own 
initiative,200 or if a party requests it and a judge or case manager decides 
it is appropriate.201 Also, certain cases, such as family law actions, class 
proceedings, and estate matters are exempt from this rule.202
In Quebec, the court, under its case management powers, has the 
power to impose joint expert evidence in some circumstances, in order to 
uphold the principles of proportionality and ef ciency.203 This new power 
to impose joint expert evidence resembles the rules around expert evidence 
that came into place in the United Kingdom after the Woolf report.204 In 
the United Kingdom, the court can direct that evidence be given by a 
single joint expert.205 This was a move towards the model in mainland 
European countries (e.g. France), where expert evidence is provided by 
a neutral expert appointed by the court.206 No such equivalent exists in 
Ontario, but Osborne’s Civil Justice Reform Project report made a number 
of recommendations regarding expert evidence.207 On the subject of 
joint experts, the report did not propose that the use of joint experts be 
mandatory. Osborne instead suggested that “early in the litigation process, 
195. Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 6 at R 77.04(1) compared with Bill n°28 Art 158 
CCP. The list of powers granted to the judge or case management master under Ontario rule 77.04(1) 
are described in broad language. E.g. per R 77.04(1)(e) a judge or case management master may 
“make orders, impose terms, give directions and award costs as necessary…” The powers granted to 
the court in Quebec are very expansive, and are also described in much more detailed language. 
196. Bill n°28 Art 9(2) CCP. Case management is described as a mission of the courts. 
197. Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 6 at R 77.02(1).
198. Ibid, R 77.01(1).
199. Ibid, R 77.05(1).
200. Ibid, R 77.05(2)(a).
201. Ibid, R 77.05(2)(b).
202. Ibid, R 77.02(2).
203. Bill n°28 Art 158(2) CCP. 
204. Lord Woolf, supra note 1. 
205. See Civil Procedural Rules, supra note 46, rule 35.7.
206. Eric Barbier de la Serre & Anne-Lise Sibony, “Expert Evidence Before the EC Courts” (2008) 
45 Common Market Law Review 941 at 942. 
207. Osborne, “Civil Justice Reform,” supra note 49.
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parties should discuss jointly retaining a single expert to reduce costs 
and avoid unnecessary competing expert reports…” Since the possibility 
for the court to impose joint expert evidence was introduced in the 2016 
Code, it has been the subject of much controversy. It is argued that it might 
interfere with the adversarial nature of a case, by impeding the parties’ 
abilities to assert their contentions,208 and that it might give the expert a 
quasi-decision-making role.209 Commentary by practitioners suggest that 
joint experts are rarely used.210 Thus, in practice, there appears to be little 
difference between Ontario and Quebec when it comes to joint expert 
evidence. 
These Quebec tools, in many ways, have the potential to make trials 
more proportional, minimize delays and reduce costs, and meet the goal of 
creating greater access for unrepresented litigants. They do not carry the 
same concerns as summary judgment. Case protocol, case management, 
and limits on expert joint witnesses are simply ways of streamlining 
the process, catching issues early, and shortening trial. Like summary 
judgment, the court can control the amount of evidence and the way that 
it is presented to some extent, for instance through not approving a case 
protocol and working with parties to adapt it, and through case management 
options such as limiting parties to having a joint expert. Judges, however, 
still receive a full account of the record unlike in summary judgment 
proceedings. The balance between searching for truth and creating access 
to the justice system may still lean towards the search for truth, as it might 
not suf ciently bring down procedural time and costs. The concern about 
losing precedent and not advancing the law is less of a concern in Quebec 
than in the common law provinces, as cases have less precedential value 
in the civil system. Since full trials still occur, however, these judgments 
can be referenced in future cases. 
It is possible that, as with summary judgments, the case protocol, case 
management conference, and case management measures might not save, 
or could even add time. For instance, a party might not collaborate on 
making the case protocol within the appropriate time frame, in which case 
they may have to appear before a judge who could grant more time to 
208. See e.g. David-Emmanuel Roberge, “Class Actions and Joint Expert Evidence: Guidelines From 
the Quebec Court of Appeal” (6 March 2019), online: Lexology <https://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=45c541f7-5210-4d10-9cdb-8ac0b942fa29> [https://perma.cc/2K8Z-Q7GK].
209. Alexandra Teasdale & Dominic Naud, “Quebec’s New Code of Civil Procedure and Expert 
Evidence: Five Key Changes” (25 November 2015), online: mondaq <http://www.mondaq.com/
canada/x/445922/Civil+Law/Quebecs+New+Code+Of+Civil+Procedure+And+Expert+Evidence+Fi
ve+Key+Changes> [https://perma.cc/HG8D-RLNH].
210. E.g. Roberge, supra note 208. Roberge asserts that courts will be reluctant to impose joint expert 
evidence because of not wanting to interfere with the adversarial nature of lawsuits.
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put together the case protocol. In such a scenario, the process would be 
delayed because of the tools designed to streamline the process.211 Finally, 
there is a concern that summary judgment will be used as a litigation tactic. 
This concern does not apply to the Quebec tools, as the case protocol is 
mandated by the court, and while parties can request case management 
measures, these measures were designed to help the trial move smoothly. 
It seems unlikely that the court would apply these measures if they were 
going to slow down the proceedings or make it costlier. 
Conclusion 
These observations highlight the ways that Quebec, through its own tools, 
and without a summary judgment equivalent, is embracing the post-
Hryniak cultural shift towards improving access to justice. As access to 
justice remains a problem in Canada, and around the world, transsystemic 
analysis will help the legal community implement new procedural tools 
from other jurisdictions, and other legal traditions, assess how these 
tools work, and think about how these tools can be implanted into new 
jurisdictions. Knowing what tools Quebec uses to improve access to justice 
allows us to think about where summary judgment might  t into Quebec 
procedural law, and whether it would be a useful addition to the province’s 
procedural law. Summary judgment is a natural  t with the principle 
of proportionality and the active management of cases—both of which 
are fundamental to Quebec procedural law. Quebec’s case management, 
however, already allows the court to expedite proceedings and shorten 
trials.212 As discussed, Article 154 seems to allow the court to proceed 
immediately to trial from the case management conference, and to decide 
the case largely based on af davits. Expedited trials ful ll many of the 
goals of summary judgment. There are two aspects of summary judgment 
that could be implanted in Quebec. First, in Ontario, there has been an 
increase in the number of summary judgment motions and in the number 
of full, or partial, summary judgments being granted. This enthusiasm 
for trying to expedite trials, that has grown alongside the widening of the 
summary judgment rule, should be fostered in Quebec so that the Quebec 
courts use their case management powers to expedite and simplify more 
proceedings, where possible. Second, when a Quebec court is making 
an assessment under Article 154 on whether to try a case immediately, 
it might be instructive for the court to consider Ontario’s “genuine issue 
requiring trial” test, and case law, as a guide in making this decision. If a 
211. See e.g. 9268-9579 Quebec, supra note 155 where the respondent did not  le the case protocol 
within the 45 days. 
212. Bill n°28, supra note 116, Art 158 CCP.
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Quebec case appears to have no genuine issue requiring trial, this could 
mean that the case should proceed immediately to trial. This suggestion is 
made tentatively, because how this part of Article 154 is meant to work in 
practice is still not completely clear.
Learning about Quebec tools to improve access to justice, and how 
these compare with the summary judgment, allows one to consider 
whether, and how, these might be applied in other Canadian provinces. 
For instance, some Ontario cases in Ottawa, Toronto, and Windsor are set 
on a case management track. 213 It might be prudent for Ontario to move 
towards Quebec’s approach of managing all cases in order to expedite and 
simplify proceedings. 
213. Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 6 at R 77.02(1).
